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ABSTRACT 
 
This paper examines the relationship between the regional variation in social capital in the United 
States and the propensity and properties of the management earnings forecasts. Social capital 
refers to connections among individuals–social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam 2000). Using a comprehensive sample of companies 
in the United States, we find that firms located in region with higher social capital are more likely 
to issue a management earnings forecast and are inclined to forecast more frequently. In addition, 
earnings forecasts made by those firms tend to be more specific. Our findings suggest that 
mangers of firms in the high social capital regions are more likely to be concerned about their 
reputation of providing transparent information regarding their businesses because of the close 
connections among individuals and the greater propensities to honor obligations. This study 
contributes to the accounting literature by identifying a non-financial factor (i.e., social capital) 
that affects management’s voluntary disclosure practices. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
ocial capital refers to connections among individuals–social networks and the norms of reciprocity and 
trustworthiness that arise from them (Putnam 2000). High social capital areas comprise individuals with 
higher degrees of mutual trust, more community-centric attitudes, and greater propensities to honor 
obligations (Jha 2012). Researchers in sociology, political science, and economics have invoked the concept of 
social capital in their research. For example, it has been shown that social capital affects economy development 
(Knack and keefer 1997, Guiso, Sapienaza and Zingales 2004), cost of capital (Uzzi 1999), efficiency of 
government (Putnam 1993, Knack 2002), corruption (LaPorta, LopezDeSilanes, Shleifer, and Vishny 1997), 
organizational dissolution rates (Pennings, Lee, and van Witteloostuijn 1998), supplier relations (Baker 1990), and 
entrepreneurship (Chong and Gibbons 1997).  
 
Accounting is influenced by the environment in which it operates. Jaggi (1975) argues that, apart from the 
economic, legal, and political environment, the cultural environment and individual value orientations influence the 
generation of reliable financial information. This suggests that social capital may have an impact on the management 
financial reporting behavior. However, there is limited empirical studies examine the influence of social capital on 
management financial reporting choices. Jha (2012) is the first study that investigates the role that social capital may 
play in the corporate financial reporting context. Specifically, Jha (2012) finds that earnings management is lower 
for firms headquartered in high social capital regions. Jha’s study contributes to literature by demonstrating the role 
of social capital on management’s misbehavior over the mandatorily disclosed financial information. As we know, 
in addition to mandatorily disclosed financial information (e.g. annual/quarterly financial reports and other SEC 
filings), companies also voluntarily disclose financial information via news release, conference calls, etc. 
Researchers have shown that voluntary disclosures provide more information to investors than mandatory 
disclosures do (Beyer, Cohen, Lys, and Walther 2010). Moreover, managers have different incentives for disclosing 
financial information voluntarily and different degrees of flexibility over voluntary disclosure than those for 
S 
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mandatory disclosure. Therefore, we need to explore further to better understand the relationship between social 
capital and corporate financial reporting practices. This paper aims at investigating the influence of social capital on 
management voluntary disclosure practices. 
 
Prior work studying voluntary disclosure identifies both the motives and constrains for managers to provide 
voluntary disclosures. The key factors motivating voluntary disclosures include reduced information asymmetries, 
improved liquidity in firm’s stocks, reduced cost of capital, mitigated litigation risk, and reputation for transparent 
and accurate reporting. On the other hand, proprietary cost of disclosure, reputational risks of erroneous forecasts, 
and avoidance of setting an unmaintainable disclosure precedent deter voluntary disclosures (see Hirst, Koonce, and 
Venkataraman 2008 and Beyer et al. 2010 for a review of determinants of voluntary disclosures). Overall, existing 
literature suggests that managers acting in the best interests of the firm should enhance transparency by issuing more 
frequent, specific, and accurate forecasts, while mangers acting in their own self-interest could decide to disclose 
less than what is optimal for  various reasons (Ajinkya, Bhojraj and Sengupta 2005).  
 
Since social capital literature suggests that in high social capital regions people tend be less opportunistic 
and more inclined to honor their obligations, mangers of firms in the high social capital regions are more likely to 
act in the best interests of their firms. Furthermore, mangers of firms in the high social capital regions are more 
likely to be concerned about their reputation of providing transparent information regarding their businesses because 
of the close connections among individuals. Therefore, when it comes to voluntary disclosure, it is reasonable to 
expect that managers of firms in high social capital regions are likely to issue more frequent, precise, and accurate 
forecasts to enhance transparency and to develop and maintain a reputation for transparent reporting.  However, 
managers may face loss of reputation and credibility if they are unable to deliver on their forecasts (Cheng, 
Subramanyam and Zhang, 2007). This suggests that if managers of firms headquartered in the high social capital 
regions are more fear of starting a practice that they might later want to abandon and are concerned more about the 
distortion of their reputation of meeting their forecasts, and then they may tend to provide less voluntary disclosures 
in quantity and depth. Therefore, the impact of social capital on voluntary disclosures becomes an empirical 
question. 
 
Using annual management earnings forecasts issued from 1997 to 2008 by Thomson Reuters and the social 
capital data provided by the Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development of Pennsylvania State University, we 
find that firms located in regions with higher social capital are more likely to issue management earnings forecasts. 
In addition, earnings forecasts made by those firms tend to be more precise. These findings are consistent the notion 
that mangers of firms in the high social capital regions tend to develop a reputation for transparent reporting by 
providing more voluntary disclosures and more detailed voluntary disclosures.  
 
This study contributes to the accounting literature in the following ways. It contributes to the management 
forecast studies by identifying a non-financial factor (i.e., social capital) that affects management’s voluntary 
disclosure practices. Prior literature has documented many determinants of management’s voluntary disclosures 
(e.g., to reduce information asymmetry, to signal management capability, to reduce stock volatility, to reduce 
litigation risk, to maintain prior forecasting behavior, and avoid proprietary costs). However, to our knowledge none 
of the prior studies have shown that social capital affects the management forecast behavior. Our study fills this void 
and extends the management forecast literature to the new area that beyond the firm, individual management and the 
stock market characteristics.  
 
Our study also adds to the social capital literature by identifying a new context in which social capital plays 
a role. Researchers have invoked the concept of social capital in the areas of sociology, political science, and 
economics and they have identified various contexts in which social capital plays an important role. As far as we 
know, even though this paper is not the first one to link the social capital to corporate disclosure, but it is the first 
one to extend the study of social capital to corporate voluntary disclosure. Given the fact that voluntary disclosure is 
the primary information source for the participants of capital market, this study deepens our understanding of the 
significance of social capital.   
 
The remainder of this study is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the background of this study and 
raises the research question. Section 3 formulates the hypothesis. Section 4 describes the measures and sample used 
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in the empirical analyses. Section 5 presents the main empirical test results. Section 6 discusses robustness tests, and 
Section 7 concludes the study. 
 
BACKGROUND AND RESEARCH QUESTION 
 
Voluntary disclosures have been the interest of many researchers, because they are the primary information 
sources on the capital market.  Beyer et al. (2010) document that management earnings forecasts and earnings pre-
announcements (i.e., voluntary disclosures) accounted for about 66% of the total accounting-based information used 
by investors, while earning announcements and other SEC filings (i.e., mandatory disclosures) provide less than 
12% of the accounting-based information used by investors.  
 
Hirst et al. (2008) summarize earnings forecasts as having three components - antecedents, characteristics, 
and consequences. In terms of consequences, management earnings forecasts have been shown to affect stock prices 
(Pownall, Wasley and Waymire 1993), analysts and investor behavior (Baginski and Hassell 1990; Bushee and Noe 
2000), information asymmetry/cost of capital (Coller and Yohn 1997), earnings management (Kasznik 1999; Cheng 
et al., 2007), and litigation risk (Skinner 1994; Field, Lowry and Shu 2005). Regarding properties or attributes of 
management earnings forecasts, extant research has documented substantial variation in the types of news that 
management earnings forecasts convey (good or bad),  the accuracy, the forms (qualitative or quantitative), the 
horizon and timeliness, the delivery channel (stand-alone or bundled), and the levels of disaggregation. As for 
factors that influence whether the manger will issue a forecast or not (i.e., forecast antecedents), Hirst et al. (2008) 
summarize those factors into two categories- forecast environment and forecaster characteristics.  
 
It has been documented that firm specific characteristics such as pre-disclosure information asymmetry, 
managerial incentives, performance, volatility, corporate governance, litigation risk, firms’ prior forecasting 
behavior, and proprietary costs are correlated with the propensity and properties of the management earnings 
forecasts (Coller and Yohn 1997;  Nagar, Nanda and Wysocki 2003; Cheng and Lo 2006; Rogers and Stocken 2005; 
Miller 2002;  Waymire 1985; Ajinkya et al. 2005;  Cao and Narayanamoorthy 2011; Kasznik and Lev 1995; Skinner 
1994 and 1997; Williams 1996; Rogers and Stocken 2005; and Wang 2007).  
 
Regarding forecast environment, Hirst et al. (2008) explicitly point out the influence of the legal and 
regulatory environment and the analyst and investor environment on management earnings forecasts. As we know, 
in addition to the economic, legal, and regulatory environment, the cultural environment and individual value 
orientations influence the generation of reliable financial information (Jaggi, 1975). A growing strand of literature 
documents that the social environment where the firm is headquartered affects the corporate culture, and 
subsequently corporate decisions such as financial reporting decisions. For instance, McGuire et al. (2012) 
document that religion, as a significant sociological factor, affects financial reporting irregularities (i.e., earnings 
management and accounting restatement). Jha (2012) finds that firms headquartered in high social capital regions 
are less likely to engage in earnings management. However, those studies focus on corporate mandatory disclosures.  
Since managers have different incentives for disclosing financial information voluntarily and different degrees of 
flexibility over voluntary disclosures than those for mandatory disclosures, this leads naturally to the question of 
whether social environment also impact corporate voluntary disclosures? The objective of this paper is to provide 
some insights into this question. 
 
HYPOTHESIS 
 
Transparent Scenario 
 
Existing accounting literature suggests that managers acting in the best interests of the firm should enhance 
transparency by issuing more frequent, specific, and accurate forecasts, while managers acting in their own self-
interest could decide to disclose less than what is optimal for  various reasons (Ajinkya et al. 2005). Social capital 
literature suggests that in high social capital regions people tend be less opportunistic and more inclined to honor 
their obligations and this reduces the transaction cost associated with any economic activity involving cooperation or 
mutual trust (Jha 2012). Assuming that employees reside close to the firm and there is congruence among 
employees’ value orientation, corporate culture and corporate behavior, it is reasonable to argue that employees of 
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firms, mangers in particular, in the high social capital regions are more likely to act in the best interests of their 
firms.  When it comes to voluntary financial disclosure, we would expect that firms located in the high social capital 
regions are more likely to issue forecasts to enhance transparency of their firms. Furthermore, since mangers of 
firms in the high social capital regions are more likely to be concerned about their reputation of providing 
transparent information regarding their businesses because of the close connections among individuals and Graham, 
Harvey, and Rajgopal (2005)’s survey evidence shows that developing a reputation for transparent reporting is the 
key factor motivating voluntary disclosures,  it is reasonable to expect that mangers of firms in high social capital 
regions are likely to issue more specific and accurate forecasts to develop and maintain a reputation for transparent 
reporting.   
 
Commitment Cost Scenario 
 
Graham et al. (2005) also shows that the desire to avoid setting a disclosure precedent that is difficult to 
maintain in the future deters voluntary disclosures. This suggests that if managers of firms headquartered in the high 
social capital regions are more fear of starting a practice that they might later want to abandon and are concerned 
more about the distort of their reputation of meeting their self forecasts, then they may tend to provide less voluntary 
disclosures and less detailed voluntary disclosures.   
 
Because of the two competing arguments the impact of social capital on voluntary disclosures we specify 
our hypothesis as follows:  
 
H0:  Ceteris paribus, the propensity and properties of the management earnings forecasts of firms headquartered 
in regions with high social capital is not different from that of firms headquartered in regions with low 
social capital. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
The Measure Of Social Capital  
 
Following Jha (2012), we use the county-level social capital index (i.e., SC_COUNTY) provided by 
Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development (NERCRD) of Pennsylvania State University as the main 
measure of social capital in this study. Social capital index is created using principal component analysis using four 
factors- the number of associations per 10,000 people, the voter turnout, the census response rate, and the number of 
nonprofit organizations per 10,000 people. We obtain and use the county-level social capital index for 1997, 2005 
and 2009. Following Jha (2012), we linearly interpolate the data to obtain the values in the missing years (1998 to 
2004 and 2006 to 2008). Furthermore, we use other two state-level social capital indices (i.e., SC_PUTNAM and 
SC_HONESTY) as the measures of social capital. SC_PUTNAM is constructed using 14 indicators including 
responses to survey questions pertaining to trust, honesty and voluntary work and information from secondary data 
such as membership in organizations and voters turnout (Putnam 2000). SC_HONESTY is a measure constructed by 
DDM Needham Life Style Surveys based on the responses to survey questions like “if most people are honest”. For 
all of those three measures, a greater value indicates higher social capital. Table 1 presents the social capital index 
for each state.  
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Table 1: Social Capital Index by State 
Rank States SC_COUNTY  Rank States SC_COUNTY 
1 District of Columbia 3.018  26 Rhode Island -0.187 
2 North Dakota 2.323  27 Oklahoma -0.239 
3 South Dakota 1.929  28 Idaho -0.26 
4 Kansas 1.681  29 New Mexico -0.436 
5 Nebraska 1.68  30 Maryland -0.438 
6 Minnesota 1.654  31 New York -0.441 
7 Montana 1.525  32 Texas -0.528 
8 Iowa 1.451  33 Delaware -0.541 
9 Wyoming 1.247  34 West Virginia -0.594 
10 Colorado 0.785  35 New Jersey -0.619 
11 Vermont 0.581  36 North Carolina -0.638 
12 Maine 0.568  37 Louisiana -0.674 
13 Wisconsin 0.533  38 Mississippi -0.715 
14 Illinois 0.504  39 South Carolina -0.752 
15 Oregon 0.48  40 Arkansas -0.791 
16 New Hampshire 0.307  41 Alabama -0.793 
17 Missouri 0.267  42 Nevada -0.842 
18 Massachusetts 0.241  43 California -0.876 
19 Ohio 0.118  44 Kentucky -0.887 
20 Michigan 0.097  45 Florida -0.95 
21 Washington 0.013  46 Tennessee -1.078 
22 Indiana -0.094  47 Utah -1.167 
23 Virginia -0.105  48 Georgia -1.34 
24 Pennsylvania -0.107  49 Arizona -1.658 
25 Connecticut -0.184        
Note: Table 1 presents the social capital index (SC_COUNTY) for each state. The SC_COUNTY presented in this table are the 
average of the county level social capital for each state reported by NERCRD. NERCRD does not report the social capital 
measure at the county level for Alaska and Hawaii. 
 
Table 1 reveals that District of Columbia, North Dakota and South Dakota are the three regions with 
highest social capital (i.e., SC_COUNTY), whereas Utah, Georgia and Arizona are the three regions with the lowest 
social capital. The data also reveals that there is a fair amount of variation in the level of social capital across 
regions. SC_COUNTY varies from -1.658 (for Arizona) to 3.018 (for District of Columbia).  
 
Measures Of Management Earnings Forecasts Propensity And Properties 
 
Since management earnings forecasts are voluntary disclosures, the first question confronting managers is 
whether or not to issue a forecast. We use OCCUR as the measure of management earnings forecasts propensity. 
OCCUR equals 1 if the firm issues at least one earnings forecast during a fiscal period and 0 otherwise. When 
testing the forecast occurrence, we do not distinguish a firm that issues just a single forecast and a firm that issues 
multiple forecasts in the period. To gain the insight into the impact of social capital on the frequency of management 
earnings forecasts, we construct a measure for forecast frequency (i.e., FREQ) which equals the number of forecasts 
issued by a firm in a fiscal period for all the firm-year that has at least one forecast. We treat multiple forecasts 
issued by the same firm on the same day as one forecast. After making the decision of whether to issue an earnings 
forecast or not, managers then face a broad array of choices regarding the attributes of their forecasts. We use 
QUANN as the measure of the form of forecasts. QUANN equals the number of point or range forecasts made by a 
firm in a fiscal year. The point and range forecasts (such as “about 0.50” or “between 0.46 and 0.50”) are viewed as 
more specific than the open-end or qualitative forecasts (such as “more than 0.50” or “comfortable with analyst 
expectations”). We use the management earnings forecast data provided by Thomson Reuters to construct the above 
measures. 
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Regression Model  
 
To test our hypothesis, we employ the following model: 
 
FORECAST_P = β0 + β1 SC_COUNTY + β2 OUTDIR + β3 INST + β4 LMVAL + β5 AUDIT + β6 NUMEST + β7 
DISPFOR + β8 LITIGATE + β9 MKBK + β10 LOSS + β11 NEWS  + β12 EARNVOL+β13 BETA + β14 RD + β15 URBAN 
+β16 REL + β17 FD+ Σβχi YEAR +Σβγi INDUSTRYi + error        (1) 
 
Model (1) is similar to that used by Ajinkya et al. (2005).
 1
  FORECAST_P is either OCCUR, FREQ, or 
QUANN. Firms’ specific characteristics such as size (LMVAL), investor and analysts environment (INST, NUMEST, 
DISPFOR, and FD), information environment (AUDIT), performance (NEWS and LOSS), systemic risk (BETA), 
earnings volatility (EARNVOL), corporate governance (OUTDIR), litigation risk (LITIGATE), proprietary costs 
(MKBK and RD), and geographic location (URBAN) are included to control for other determinants of management 
forecasts that have been identified by prior studies. To alleviate the potential correlated omitted variable problem 
suggested by Hilary and Hui (2009), we add REL (a measure of the religiosity of the region) to the model. We also 
include YEAR -a year dummy and INDUSTRY - an industry dummy to control for the time effect and industry effect.
 
Please see appendix for the details about those variables. 
 
The impact of social capital on management earnings is captured by β1, the coefficient on SC_COUNTY. 
An insignificant β1 indicates that social capital has no impact on management earnings forecast. A positive and 
significant β1 indicates that firms located in counties with higher social capital are on average more likely to issue 
earnings forecasts or to issue more precise forecasts than firms located in counties with lower social capital. A 
negative and significant β1 suggests the opposite.  
 
Sample Selection  
 
The sample used in the main tests consists of all firms headquartered in the United States that have the 
required data from Compustat (for financial accounting information), CRSP (for stock return information), the 
Investor Responsibility Research Center (IRRC) (for ownership and board information), and Thomson Reuters (for 
management earnings forecasts and analysts forecasts information). We delete firm-year observations with negative 
total assets or negative total book values to eliminate outliers. In this paper, we study only the annual forecasts. 
These sample requirements result in 28,448 firm-year observations covering the period 1997-2008. For certain 
robustness tests, sample sizes vary due to different data constraints.  
 
MAIN EMPIRICAL ANALYSES 
 
Sample Descriptive Statistics 
 
Panel A of Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the forecasting group and control group.  The 
forecasting group consists 17,614 firm-years with at least one annual earnings forecast during that year. The control 
group (i.e., non-forecasting group) consists 10,834 firm-years without an annual earnings forecast during that year. 
We find that the social capital indices (i.e., SC_COUNTY, SC_PUTNAM and SC_HONESTY) for the forecasting 
firms are significantly higher than those for non-forecasting firms, except that the difference in the median 
SC_PUTNAM is insignificant. Panel B of Table 2 presents the Pearson correlations among variables. It shows that 
SC_COUNTY  is positively related to OCCUR, FREQ, and QUANN. Collectively, Table 2 provides the preliminary 
evidence that supports the positive relationship between social capital and management forecast.   
 
Table 2 also reveals that the forecasting firms are different from non-forecasting firms in many other firm-
level characteristics. For instance, forecasting firm-years tend to have more outside directors (OUTDIR), more 
institutional investors (INST), larger market capitalization (LMVAL), more Big 4 auditors (AUDIT), more analysts 
following (NUMEST), higher analyst forecast dispersion, higher litigation risk (LITIGATE), higher market-to-book 
                                                 
1 Following Ajinkya et al. (2005), we also include HORIZON as an additional independent variable when using QUANN as the dependent 
variable. 
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ratio, less frequent accounting losses (LOSS), more positive earnings news, less earnings volatility (EARNVOL), 
more systemic risk (BETA), less proprietary costs (RD), and more religious corporate culture than non-forecasting 
firm-years.  Therefore, multivariate regression analyses are necessary to draw reliable inferences on the relationship 
between social capital and management forecast. 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics 
Panel A: Forecasting Group vs. Control Group 
 
Mean Median 
Variables 
Forecasting 
Group 
(n=17,614) 
Control Group 
(n=10,834) 
Diff. 
p-value 
Forecasting 
Group 
(n=17,614) 
Control 
Group 
(n=10,834) 
Diff. 
p-value 
SC_COUNTY -0.373 -0.528 <.0001 -0.280 -0.507 <.0001 
SC_PUTNAM -0.165 -0.182 0.0061 -0.190 -0.180 0.9789 
SC_HONESTY 3.808 3.803 <.0001 3.790 3.790 <.0001 
OUTDIR 69.284 66.031 <.0001 70.382 67.476 <.0001 
INST 68.121 47.778 <.0001 72.154 53.321 <.0001 
LMVAL 7.708 6.651 <.0001 7.589 6.482 <.0001 
AUDIT 0.924 0.875 <.0001 1.000 1.000 <.0001 
NUMEST 11.324 8.322 <.0001 10.000 6.000 <.0001 
DISPFOR 0.056 0.032 <.0001 0.024 0.026 0.0183 
LITIGATE 0.065 0.027 <.0001 0.000 0.000 <.0001 
MKBK 3.643 3.452 <.0001 2.640 2.312 <.0001 
LOSS 0.045 0.217 <.0001 0.000 0.000 <.0001 
NEWS 0.715 0.623 <.0001 1.000 1.000 <.0001 
EARNVOL 0.314 0.387 <.0001 0.181 0.162 <.0001 
BETA 0.841 0.817 <.0001 0.844 0.784 <.0001 
RD 0.027 0.049 <.0001 0.000 0.000 0.0618 
URBAN 0.526 0.523 0.6288 1.000 1.000 0.6288 
REL 5.952 5.895 <.0001 6.028 6.033 0.0001 
 
Panel B: Pearson Correlation Matrix 
  OCCUR FREQ QUANN OUTDIR INST LMVAL AUDIT NUMEST DISPFOR LITIGATE 
SC_COUNTY 0.083 0.038 0.030 0.041 0.007 0.047 0.011 -0.032 -0.013 -0.025 
 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2143 <.0001 0.0581 <.0001 0.0301 <.0001 
OCCUR  . . 0.130 0.348 0.302 0.084 0.228 0.035 0.084 
  . . <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
FREQ   0.967 0.148 0.257 0.320 0.068 0.235 -0.020 0.049 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0094 <.0001 
QUANN    0.146 0.267 0.291 0.065 0.212 -0.020 0.045 
    <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0066 <.0001 
OUTDIR     0.116 0.135 0.025 0.087 -0.001 -0.066 
     <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.8996 <.0001 
INST      0.201 0.110 0.222 0.033 0.072 
      <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 
LMVAL       0.210 0.739 0.012 -0.070 
       <.0001 <.0001 0.037 <.0001 
AUDIT        0.149 0.012 0.031 
        <.0001 0.0463 <.0001 
NUMEST         0.017 0.014 
         0.0042 0.0189 
DISPFOR          0.016 
          0.0066 
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(Table 2 continued) 
 MKBK LOSS NEWS EARNVOL BETA RD URBAN REL FD HORIZON 
LITIGATE -0.012 -0.035 -0.007 -0.035 -0.029 -0.112 -0.040 0.055 0.031 0.017 
 0.0355 <.0001 0.2688 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.024 
MKBK  0.023 0.094 -0.070 0.161 0.223 0.098 0.017 -0.085 -0.026 
  0.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.0049 <.0001 0.0005 
LOSS   -0.27 0.21 0.12 0.42 0.06 0.01 -0.05 0.04 
   <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2801 <.0001 <.0001 
NEWS    -0.133 -0.001 -0.054 0.007 0.008 0.018 -0.032 
    <.0001 0.9319 <.0001 0.2238 0.1604 0.0023 <.0001 
EARNVOL     0.064 0.052 0.039 0.032 0.006 0.024 
     <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.2837 0.0017 
BETA      0.242 0.110 0.031 0.208 0.012 
      <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 <.0001 0.1045 
RD       0.148 0.012 -0.038 -0.010 
       <.0001 0.036 <.0001 0.1686 
URBAN        0.331 0.011 0.001 
        <.0001 0.0625 0.9106 
REL         0.024 0.001 
         <.0001 0.8868 
FD          0.065 
                    <.0001 
Note: Panel A of Table 2 reports the summary statistics for the forecasting group and control group. The difference in means 
and medians between forecasting group and control group are tested based on t-tests and Wilcoxon tests, respectively. All 
continuous variables are winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. Panel B of Table 2 reports the Pearson correlation among 
variables. Except for FREQ, QUANN and HORIZON, the correlation between variables are calculated using 28,448 
observations (that is, the full sample). The correlation between FREQ, QUANN, HORIZON and other variables are calculated 
using 17, 614 observations (i.e., the forecasting group). Please see the appendix for the variable definitions. p-values are 
provided below each coefficient.  
 
Main Test Results 
 
The logistic regression results of Equation (1) when using OCCUR as the dependent variable is reported in 
the Colum (1) of Table 3. We find that the coefficient on SC_COUNTY, β1, is significantly positive (Coeff. = 
0.0997, p <0.001). This suggests that the probability of issuing a management earnings forecast is significantly 
higher for firms that are headquartered in the regions with higher social capital indices. Colum (2) and (3) of Table 3 
present the OLS regression results of Equation (1) when FREQ and QUANN are used as the dependent variable, 
respectively. In each case, the coefficient on SC_COUNTY, β1, is positive and significant. Specifically, the β1 is 
0.0560 (p = 0.0015) when FREQ is the dependent variable and the β1 is 0.0468 (p-value = 0.0087) when QUANN is 
the dependent variable. Those findings indicate that firms headquartered in regions with high social capital indices 
are likely to have more frequent earnings forecasts and tend to issue more specific earnings forecasts. 
 
The signs of the coefficients on the control variables are, in general, consistent with those indicated in the 
literature (e.g., Ajinkya et al, 2005). For instance, the signs suggest that firms with more outside directors 
(OUTDIR), more institutional owners and (INST), more analysts following (NUMEST), larger size (LMVAL) and 
greater litigation exposure (LITIGATE) are more likely to issue management earnings forecast. Furthermore, those 
firms are inclined to forecast more frequently and their forecast tend to be more precise.  Firms with more 
uncertainty in the earnings prospects (DISPFOR and EARNVOL), loss (LOSS),  higher systematic risk (BETA), more 
R&D expenditures (RD) are likely to issue forecast less frequently and tend to issue less precise forecasts. The 
positive coefficient on FD indicates an increase in the level of forecast activity after the passage of Reg FD. The 
results also show that the religiosity of the region (REL), which is used as a proxy for firm’s risk aversion in Hilary 
and Hui (2009), is positively related to the management earnings forecast occurrence, frequency, and precision.  
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Table 3: Social Capital and the Propensity and Property of Management Earnings Forecasts 
Variable Predicted sign 
Colum (1) 
Dependent var. 
=OCCUR 
Colum (2) 
Dependent var. 
=FREQ 
Colum (3) 
Dependent var. 
= QUANN 
INTERCEPT ? 
-1.9108*** 
(<.0001) 
-1.3969*** 
(<.0001) 
-1.5543*** 
(<.0001) 
SC_COUNTY ? 
0.0997*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0560*** 
(0.0015) 
0.0468*** 
(0.0087) 
OUTDIR + 
0.0076*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0106*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0101*** 
(<.0001) 
INST + 
0.0051*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0026*** 
(0.0007) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0001) 
LMVAL + 
0.1547*** 
(<.0001) 
0.3301*** 
(<.0001) 
0.3043*** 
(<.0001) 
AUDIT + 
-0.0237 
(0.4606) 
0.0673 
(0.2371) 
0.1065* 
(0.0639) 
NUMEST + 
0.0089*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0138*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0136*** 
(<.0001) 
DISPFOR - 
-0.1045*** 
(0.0004) 
-0.1276* 
(0.0943) 
-0.1343* 
(0.0811) 
LITIGATE ? 
0.3397*** 
(0.0002) 
0.5341*** 
(<.0001) 
0.5117*** 
(<.0001) 
MKBK - 
-0.0038 
(0.1884) 
-0.0076* 
(0.1073) 
-0.0204*** 
(<.0001) 
LOSS - 
-0.7336*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.4704*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.4809*** 
(<.0001) 
NEWS - 
0.0349* 
(0.0755) 
0.1106*** 
(0.0007) 
0.1211 
(0.0002)** 
EARNVOL - 
-0.0566*** 
(0.0003) 
-0.0561* 
(0.0966) 
-0.0580 
(0.0890) 
BETA - 
-0.1779*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.2355*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.2603*** 
(<.0001) 
RD - 
-1.9115*** 
(<.0001) 
-3.1104*** 
(<.0001) 
-2.6847*** 
(<.0001) 
URBAN + 
0.0149 
(0.4378) 
-0.0455 
(0.1326) 
-0.0672** 
(0.0278) 
REL + 
0.0473*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0748*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0763 
(<.0001) 
FD + 
0.7549*** 
(<.0001) 
2.9575*** 
(<.0001) 
3.4111*** 
(<.0001) 
HORIZON - 
  
-0.0003*** 
(0.0163) 
YEAR ? yes yes yes 
INDUSTRY ? yes yes yes 
Log likelihood/Adj. R2 
 
10148.70 30.27% 32.07% 
No. of observations 
 
28,448 17,614 17,614 
Note: This table presents the regression results of Equation (1) when OCCUR, FREQ, and QUANN are used as the 
dependent variable, respectively.  Please see the appendix for the variable definitions. All continuous variables are 
winsorized at the 1st and 99th percentiles. For brevity, the coefficients on the industry dummies and year dummies are not 
reported. p-values are provided in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, 
and 1% levels, respectively. 
 
In summary, the results presented in Table 3 reject the null hypothesis and support the transparent reporting 
hypothesis. That is, mangers of firms in the high social capital regions are more likely to be concerned about their 
reputation of providing transparent information regarding their businesses because of the close connections among 
individuals and the greater propensities to honor obligations. 
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ROBUSTNESS TESTS  
 
Alternative Measures Of Social Capital 
 
To alleviate the concern that our results might be specific to the way the social capital is measured, we 
conduct analysis by using alternative measures of social capital, namely, SC_PUTNAM and SC_HONESTY. Table 4 
shows that both SC_PUTNAM and SC_HONESTY are positively related with the management earnings forecast 
propensity and properties (i.e., OCCUR, FREQ, QUANN). This suggests that the main findings of this study are not 
sensitive to the choice of social capital measure. 
 
Table 4: Using Alternative Social Capital Measures 
Panel A: Social Capital Measure=SC_PUTNAM 
Variable Predicted sign 
Dependent var. 
=OCCUR 
Dependent var. 
=FREQ 
Dependent var. 
=QUANN 
INTERCEPT ? 
-1.7750*** 
(<.0001) 
-1.2935*** 
(<.0001) 
-1.4648*** 
(<.0001) 
SC_PUTNAM ? 
0.0853*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0675** 
(0.0212) 
0.0678** 
(0.0218) 
OUTDIR + 
0.0076*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0105*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0100*** 
(<.0001) 
INST + 
0.0052*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0029*** 
(0.0001) 
LMVAL + 
0.1632*** 
(<.0001) 
0.3342*** 
(<.0001) 
0.3078*** 
(<.0001) 
AUDIT + 
-0.0140 
(0.6637) 
0.0755 
(0.1842) 
0.1139** 
(0.0474) 
NUMEST + 
0.0075*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0134*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0133*** 
(<.0001) 
DISPFOR - 
-0.1035*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.1241* 
(0.1037) 
-0.1310* 
(0.0889) 
LITIGATE ? 
0.3245*** 
(0.0004) 
0.5296*** 
(<.0001) 
0.5097*** 
(<.0001) 
MKBK - 
-0.0037 
(0.2015) 
-0.0075* 
(0.1098) 
-0.0204*** 
(<.0001) 
LOSS - 
-0.7307*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.4679*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.4786*** 
(<.0001) 
NEWS - 
0.0338* 
(0.0849) 
0.1101*** 
(0.0007) 
0.1208*** 
(0.0002) 
EARNVOL - 
-0.0520*** 
(0.0009) 
-0.0547* 
(0.1052) 
-0.0567* 
(0.0963) 
BETA - 
-0.1779*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.2337*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.2589*** 
(<.0001) 
RD - 
-1.9894*** 
(<.0001) 
-3.2181*** 
(<.0001) 
-2.7883*** 
(<.0001) 
URBAN + 
-0.0041 
(0.8280) 
-0.0535* 
(0.0746) 
-0.0727*** 
(0.0165) 
REL + 
0.0114 
(0.2382) 
0.0526*** 
(0.0008) 
0.0579*** 
(0.0003) 
FD + 
0.7496*** 
(<.0001) 
2.9535*** 
(<.0001) 
3.4072*** 
(<.0001) 
HORIZON - 
  -0.0003*** 
(0.0155) 
YEAR ? yes yes yes 
INDUSTRY ? yes yes yes 
Log likelihood/R2 
 
10090.61 30.25% 32.07% 
No. of observations 
 
28,448 17,614 17,614 
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Panel B: Social Capital Measure=SC_HONESTY 
Variable Predicted Sign 
Dependent var. 
=OCCUR 
Dependent var. 
=FREQ 
Dependent var. 
=QUANN 
INTERCEPT ? 
-3.1516*** 
(<.0001) 
-5.0445*** 
(<.0001) 
-5.6001*** 
(<.0001) 
SC_HONESTY ? 
0.3577*** 
(0.0002) 
0.9881*** 
(<.0001) 
1.0899*** 
(<.0001) 
OUTDIR + 
0.0076*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0100*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0094*** 
(<.0001) 
INST + 
0.0052*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0025*** 
(0.0010) 
0.0028*** 
(0.0002) 
LMVAL + 
0.1626*** 
(<.0001) 
0.3325*** 
(<.0001) 
0.3059*** 
(<.0001) 
AUDIT + 
-0.0148 
(0.6435) 
0.0838 
(0.1403) 
0.1234** 
(0.0316) 
NUMEST + 
0.0076*** 
(0.0005) 
0.0143*** 
(<.0001) 
0.0143*** 
(<.0001) 
DISPFOR - 
-0.1032*** 
(0.0005) 
-0.1219* 
(0.1096) 
-0.1284* 
(0.0951) 
LITIGATE ? 
0.330*** 
(0.0003) 
0.5510*** 
(<.0001) 
0.5344*** 
(<.0001) 
MKBK - 
-0.0035 
(0.2193) 
-0.0082* 
(0.0798) 
-0.0212*** 
(<.0001) 
LOSS - 
-0.7287*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.4650*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.4753*** 
(<.0001) 
NEWS - 
0.0348* 
(0.0767) 
0.1132*** 
(0.0005) 
0.1242*** 
(0.0001) 
EARNVOL - 
-0.0527*** 
(0.0008) 
-0.0559* 
(0.0971) 
-0.0580* 
(0.0885) 
BETA - 
-0.1769*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.2295*** 
(<.0001) 
-0.2542*** 
(<.0001) 
RD - 
-1.9520*** 
(<.0001) 
-3.2888*** 
(<.0001) 
-2.8743*** 
(<.0001) 
URBAN + 
-0.0104 
(0.5810) 
-0.0571** 
(0.0556) 
-0.0760*** 
(0.0117) 
REL + 
0.0116 
(0.2301) 
0.0556*** 
(0.0004) 
0.0612*** 
(0.0001) 
FD + 
0.7482*** 
(<.0001) 
2.9472*** 
(<.0001) 
3.4001*** 
(<.0001) 
HORIZON - 
  
-0.0003*** 
(0.0143) 
YEAR ? yes yes yes 
INDUSTRY ? yes yes yes 
Log likelihood/R2 
 
10081.79 30.39% 32.23% 
No. of observations 
 
28,448 17,614 17,614 
Note: This table presents the regression results of Equation (1) when using SC_PUTNAM and SC_HONESTY as alternative 
social capital measures. Please see the appendix for the variable definitions.  All continuous variables are winsorized at the 
1st and 99th percentiles. For brevity, the coefficients on the industry dummies and year dummies are not reported.  p-values 
are provided in parentheses below each coefficient. *, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, 
respectively. 
 
Linear Interpolation Of Data Over Time 
 
Following Jha (2012), we linearly interpolate the county-level social capital index (i.e., SC_COUNTY) data 
to obtain the values in the missing years (1998 to 2004 and 2006 to 2008) when conducting the main tests. The 
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linear interpolation of data potentially creates systematic noise in a sample, which may introduce a higher level of 
exactness than is warranted (Hilary and Hui, 2009). To address this potential problem, we use the standardized rank 
of SC_COUNTY in each year as the measure of social capital and perform the analyses again. We also conduct state-
level and county-level tests. That is, we average all variables in Equation (1) at the state or county level to estimate 
the model. Untabulated results show that the main findings still hold.  
 
Alternative Sample Selection Requirements 
 
To determine whether the main test result is sensitive to the sample selection requirements, we perform the 
tests using different samples. For example, we use a sample that includes only the latest forecast if a firm makes 
multiple forecasts in a year, a sample that excludes multiple forecasts issued by the same firm on the same day, a 
sample that excludes forecasts that made after the fiscal period end and we get essentially the same results. 
 
Alternative Model Specifications 
 
To alleviate the concern that our results might be specific to the model specification, we remove the 
independent variables REL and URBAN (i.e., the two variables that are not included in Ajinkya et al., 2005) and run 
the regression. The coefficient on SC_COUNTY is still significantly positive (the result is not tabulated). We also 
substitute the Fama and French (1997) 17 industry groups with the 48 industry groups when construct the industry 
dummy and we get similar results.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
A growing strand of literature has documented that the social environment where the firm is headquartered 
affects corporate culture and subsequently corporate decisions.  This paper examines whether social capital 
influences the propensity and properties of the management earnings forecasts.  Using a sample of U.S. firms for the 
period 1997 to 2008, we find that firms located in region with higher social capital are more likely to issue a 
management earnings forecast and they tend to issue more specific forecasts.  Our findings hold after controlling for 
the investor and analysts environment and firms characteristic.  Robustness tests indicate that our findings are not 
sensitive to linear interpolation of social capital data over time, the choice of social capital metrics, model 
specifications, or sample selection requirements.  Our findings are consistent with the hypothesis that firms located 
in the high social capital regions are likely to provide more voluntary disclosures and more precise voluntary 
disclosures to enhance transparency of their firms.  Our study contributes to the accounting literature by identifying 
a non-financial factor (i.e., social capital) that affects management’s voluntary disclosure behavior.  Our study also 
contributes to the social capital literature by showing another mechanism (i.e., management earnings forecast) 
through which social capital may affect the development of the capital market. 
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APPENDIX  
 
Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
AUDIT A dummy variable that equals 1 if firm i is audited by a Big 4/5 auditor in year t; and 0 otherwise. 
BETA 
The systematic risk. It is the market model slope coefficient estimated by regressing monthly returns over 
60 months on the CRSP value weighted market return index between year’s t-6 and t-2 as in Collins and 
Kothari (1989). 
DISPFOR The standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts divided by the median forecast. 
EARNVOL The standard deviation of quarterly earnings over a 5-year rolling window (i.e., from year t-4 to year t). 
FD 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the observation is related to the post–Reg FD period (after October 
2000); and 0 otherwise. 
FREQ The number of forecasts issued by a firm in a fiscal period. 
HORIZON The number of days between the forecast date and the fiscal period-end date. 
INDUSTRY  The dummies for industry membership. We use 17 industry groups reported in Fama and French (1997).  
INST Average institutional ownership in a year. 
LITIGATE 
A dummy variable that equals 1 for all firms in the biotechnology (2833–2836 and 8731–8734), 
computers (3570–3577 and 7370–7374), electronics (3600–3674), and retail (5200–5961) industries; and 
0 otherwise. 
LMVAL The natural logarithm of market capitalization at the beginning of a fiscal year. 
LOSS A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm reported losses in the current period; and 0 otherwise. 
MKBK The market-to-book ratio at the beginning of the fiscal year. 
NEWS 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the current-period EPS is greater than or equal to the previous-period 
EPS; and 0 otherwise. 
NUMEST The number of analysts following the firm. 
OCCUR 
A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm issued an earnings forecast during the fiscal period,; and 0 
otherwise. 
OUTDIR The percentage of the board of directors that are not also officers of the firm. 
QUANN A dummy variable that equals 1 if a forecast is either a point or range forecast; and 0 otherwise. 
RD Research and development expenditures in the current year scaled by the lagged total assets.  
REL 
The degree of religiosity in the county where the firm is headquartered. It equals the number of religious 
adherents in the county divided by the total population in the county (as reported by ARDA). 
SC_COUNTY 
The county-level social capital index provided by Northeast Regional Center for Rural Development of 
Pennsylvania State University. 
SC_HONESTY The state-level social capital index provided by DDM Needham Life Style Surveys. 
SC_PUTNAM The state-level social capital index provided by Putnam (2000).  
URBAN A dummy variable that equals 1 if a firm is headquartered in one of the largest 10 metropolitan areas and 
0 otherwise. The largest 10 metropolitan areas are defined by the Office of Management and Budget. We 
use the metropolitan area definitions issued on June 30, 1999. These definitions are used for presenting 
metropolitan area statistics in Census 2000 publications. 
YEAR The year dummies. 
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